



VOTER ID:  WHAT’S AT STAKE? 
As Lyle Denniston wrote earlier this fall on SCOTUSblog.com, 
“[f]ew cases the [Supreme] Court might have agreed to hear w[ill] be 
likely to have as much real-world political impact as the newly granted 
case[] of Crawford v. Marion County Election Board . . . , involving an 
Indiana voting requirement law that is said to be among the most de-
manding in the nation.”  (Analysis:  An Election Issue for an Election Year, 
Sept. 25, 2007, http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/uncategorized/ 
analysis-an-election-issue-for-an-election-year/).  Before the Justices 
themselves have an opportunity to delve into the case, Professors 
Bradley A. Smith, of Capital University Law School, and Edward B. 
Foley, of The Ohio State University, debate the major legal, political, 
and philosophical issues behind the controversial matter of voter ID. 
Professor Smith finds no reason for the Court to tinker with Indi-
ana’s voter ID laws, and leads off the debate by invoking the “broken 
windows” theory of Kelling and Wilson.  He intuits that “to most 
Americans . . . a requirement that a voter demonstrate that he is who 
he claims to be is considered a most minimal intrusion.”  He contin-
ues, even if it is true “that a voter ID law prevents very little fraud in a 
direct sense, . . . like fixing broken windows and cleaning up litter and 
graffiti, such a basic procedure may prevent fraud from growing.  It 
sends a message that voting is serious . . . .”   
Professor Foley agrees that voting is a serious matter—so serious, 
in fact, that “[e]qual voting rights are a prerequisite to democratic 
fairness not only for their instrumental value . . . but also . . . for the 
additional symbolic . . . reason that they signify the equality of citizen-
ship upon which democratic fairness depends.”  Professor Foley sees 
Indiana’s law as unnecessarily draconian and argues that “a fair effort 
to introduce modernity and rationality to th[e] authentication process 
would use a form of public-spirited . . . reasoning that attempted to 
consider the interests of all citizens equally, rather than to select a 
more onerous than necessary method of authentication because it 
would promote a partisan advantage.” 
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The Supreme Court has agreed to hear a case on voter ID laws this 
term, Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, 472 F.3d 949 (7th Cir. 
2007), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 33 (2007).  Here, plaintiffs, including 
the Indiana Democratic Party, challenge the constitutionality of Indi-
ana’s law, which, with generous exceptions for seniors living in assisted 
living facilities, absentee voters, and indigent voters unable to obtain 
ID without payment of a fee, requires voters to produce a government-
issued photo ID in order to vote.  It is, at first glance, not at all appar-
ent that there is anything meaningful at stake in this case, despite a lot 
of hot rhetoric from partisans both left and right.  In fact, the stakes 
are high, but not in the way most people seem to think. 
The government claims that voter photo ID laws are needed to 
prevent fraud at the polling place, but the evidence that such fraud is 
common is almost entirely anecdotal and not especially compelling.  
The majority decision at the Court of Appeals, written by the eminent 
and empirically grounded Judge Richard Posner, notes that voting 
fraud is already a crime, subject to prison time and fines.  Further, the 
State conceded that, “as far an anyone knows, no one in Indiana, and 
not many people elsewhere, are known to have been prosecuted for 
impersonating a registered voter,” and, “there are no reports of such 
fraud in [Indiana].”  Id. at 953.  The Court of Appeals did suggest rea-
sons why this might be so, other than the possibility that such fraud 
does not occur frequently, but certainly the growing consensus (in 
academic circles, anyway) is that voter impersonation is an unusually 
rare occurrence.  I have publicly added my voice to that skepticism. 
On the other hand, the plaintiffs’ claims that Indiana’s law will re-
sult in massive “disenfranchisement” of poor and minority voters seem 
at least equally stretched.  Indeed, the trial court was almost scornful 
of the inability of the plaintiffs to find actual people unable to vote 
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Judge Posner noted more dryly, “There is not a single plaintiff who in-
tends not to vote because of the new law . . . .”  Id. at 951-52. 
Is this all, then, much ado about nothing?  Among political elites 
the debate has been marked by a powerful partisan divide, with most 
Republican leaders supporting voter photo ID laws and most Democ-
ratic activists opposed to them.  This suggests that there may be more 
to the claims than meets the eye, but just what?  Democrats accuse Re-
publicans of wanting to suppress the votes of minorities and the poor, 
who they argue are less likely to have photo IDs, and who they pre-
sume, probably correctly, will vote largely Democratic.  Republicans 
accuse Democrats of intentionally laying the groundwork to engage in 
electoral fraud.  In short, the voter ID debate causes activists in each 
party to see in their opposites their worst partisan stereotypes come 
seemingly to life.  I have heard activists on both sides justify their posi-
tion on voter photo ID laws wholly by reference to the opposition.  “If 
Republicans didn’t want to suppress minority votes,” say Democrats, 
“why would they fight so hard for these laws?”  Republicans retort, “If 
Democrats didn’t intend to enable voters of dubious legitimacy, if not 
obvious illegitimacy, to vote, why are they making so much fuss over 
such a minor element of electoral housekeeping?”  Meanwhile, nei-
ther side makes a very compelling case on the merits.  Perhaps this 
really is a dispute in which symbolism, at least for party activists, is 
clouding realistic appraisals of the stakes involved. 
For the parties’ rank-and-file voters, the issue seems simpler.  Pub-
lic opinion polls show overwhelming support for voter ID laws, with 
support cutting across party lines.  The private Commission on Fed-
eral Election Reform (the “Carter-Baker Commission”) recommended 
that states require photo ID, even while stating forthrightly, “[t]here is 
no evidence of extensive . . . multiple voting.”  And if the majority 
seemed casual in its recommendation, to this ear, at least, it was the 
dissenters on the Commission who sounded shrill and unconvincing 
in arguing against photo IDs. 
My own sense is that public support for voter photo ID laws can be 
attributed to what might be called the “broken windows” theory of 
election law, if we may borrow from the theory of crime prevention 
popularized in the 1990s by then-New York Mayor Rudolph Giuliani.  
The theory draws its name from a 1982 Atlantic Monthly article by 
George Kelling and James Q. Wilson.  Professor Robert C. Ellickson 
described Kelling and Wilson’s theory thusly: 
An onlooker construes the visible presence of drunks, prostitutes, litter, 
graffiti, and other low-level annoyances on a block as a sign of basic in-
adequacies of public policing . . . .  [U]ncorrected disorders tend to mul-
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tiply because a potential miscreant regards the evident absence of social 
controls at a location as an additional temptation to misbehave there. 
New Institutions for Old Neighborhoods, 48 DUKE L.J. 75, 78-79 (1998). 
Most Americans, I think, share the general view of Judge Posner, 
who noted in Crawford, “[I]t is exceedingly difficult to maneuver in 
today’s America without a photo ID (try flying, or even entering a tall 
building . . .  without one . . .) . . . .”  472 F.3d at 951.  Most Americans 
have almost certainly devoted little if any thought to voter ID laws, but 
most probably do not honestly believe that large numbers of people 
are voting fraudulently under assumed names.  Nonetheless, to most 
Americans, I suggest again merely from personal experience, a re-
quirement that a voter demonstrate that he is who he claims to be is 
considered a most minimal intrusion.  And what regular voter has not, 
at some point, wondered what would prevent her from claiming an-
other identity at the polls? 
It may be true that a voter ID law prevents very little fraud in a di-
rect sense, though a few such cases almost certainly exist; but like fix-
ing broken windows and cleaning up litter and graffiti, such a basic 
procedure may prevent fraud from growing.  It sends a message that 
voting is serious—at least as serious as cashing a paycheck or buying 
cigarettes, both of which require photo ID.  The mere sense that 
someone is likely to ask for ID may be perceived by would-be perpetra-
tors as increasing the odds of being caught and identified in some 
other type of fraud (or, we should add, voter intimidation scheme).  It 
brings a sense of order and modernity to elections, and as such may be 
perceived as indicative that other forms of fraud, such as absentee bal-
lot fraud, are also being watched and are likely to be caught.  Judge 
Posner’s Crawford opinion may inadvertently come closest to applying 
the “broken windows” analogy when it briefly compared voter fraud to 
littering, in that both crimes are exceedingly hard to catch in the act. 
Thus, voter ID laws will, I think, retain their popularity with the 
broad public.  Voter ID is seen as a basic component of any voting sys-
tem that places even the most modest priority on prevention of 
fraud—its absence both invites more serious fraud and leads to lack of 
confidence in electoral results.  Just as people would be unlikely to 
deposit money in a bank that seemed to have no visible safeguards on 
withdrawing funds from an account, voters may not participate in 
elections that seem cavalier about fraud. 
Nonetheless, were a typical citizen to read Judge Posner’s Crawford 
opinion, it would likely jar the ear.  Never one to shy from controversy, 
Judge Posner does not stop with what will seem to most as a common 
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sense approach to voter ID.  Rather, Judge Posner goes on to question 
the value to the individual of voting at all: 
A great many people who are eligible to vote don’t bother to do so.  
Many do not register, and many who do register still don’t vote, or vote 
infrequently.  The benefits of voting to the individual voter are elusive (a 
vote in a political election rarely has any instrumental value . . .), and even 
very slight costs in time or bother or out-of-pocket expense deter many 
people from voting . . . .  So some people who have not bothered to ob-
tain a photo ID will not bother to do so just to be allowed to vote, and a 
few who have a photo ID but forget to bring it to the polling place will 
say what the hell and not vote . . . . 
Crawford, 472 F.3d at 951.  What Posner says here is not controversial 
among political scientists, economists, and election experts, at least 
not since Anthony Downs’s seminal 1957 work, An Economic Theory of 
Democracy.  But this type of talk runs contrary to America’s civic myths 
about voting, and to how the Supreme Court has treated the power to 
vote. 
In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, an 1886 case dealing with the rights of Chi-
nese immigrants to operate laundries in California, the Supreme 
Court, in dicta justifying a substantive due process holding, noted that 
voting, “[t]hough not regarded strictly as a natural right, but as a privi-
lege merely conceded by society, according to its will, under certain 
conditions, nevertheless . . . is regarded as a fundamental political 
right, because [it is] preservative of all rights.”  118 U.S. 356, 370 
(1886).  That dicta then lay dormant for nearly eighty years, until res-
urrected to justify the imposition of the equal population rule into 
legislative districting in Reynolds v. Sims in 1964.  Since then the Court 
has cited Yick Wo regularly for this proposition. 
Judge Posner’s logic challenges this conception.  Crawford suggests 
that whether or not a particular individual votes, or has a ballot 
counted, does little to protect that individual’s rights.  And from the 
standpoint of a single individual, the right to speak, to bear arms, or 
even to assemble with others is probably a far more effective tool for 
preserving other rights than is voting.  An individual’s single vote will 
usually be far less effective in changing government policy than his 
ability to speak and publish, allowing him to convince many of his fel-
low citizens that government policy is wrong; or than his ability to own 
property, allowing him to protest government policy without fear of 
material deprivation by the government.  For any given individual, vot-
ing is also ineffective as a means of political expression, due to the se-
cret ballot. 
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If, as the ultimate logic of Judge Posner’s Crawford opinion sug-
gests, voting has little value as an individual “right,” then what is it?  It 
is a power granted to participate in governance of the state—a collec-
tive, instrumentalist tool that exists to assure good government, part of 
which includes, as Yick Wo might have stated, protecting individual 
liberties, such as freedom of religion or the right to property.  But 
such rights and liberties may also be protected—indeed, better pro-
tected—in other ways, such as through the structure of government 
(including bicameralism, separation of powers, and federalism) or 
limitations on government power (including the Bill of Rights and the 
doctrine of enumerated powers), though in fact many of these protec-
tions have been seriously eroded over the last seventy-five years. 
Furthermore, though voting is one means among many to protect 
rights and liberties, if unchecked it is also the power to destroy rights 
and liberties.  Individuals who violate our rights, through robbery, 
criminal assault, torts and the like, are subject to punishment.  But 
who is punished when the government violates substantive rights 
through acts of the legislature, serving as the duly elected representa-
tives of the people?  Private citizens may not lawfully turn the right to 
bear arms into a means to seize the property of some and give it to 
others (through armed robbery, theft and the like), but they may use 
their votes to empower their legislatures to do so, as the Supreme 
Court’s Kelo v. City of New London decision starkly reminds us.  Thus, 
while voting is not terribly important as an individual right, there may 
be powerful reasons to check its use as the power to destroy liberty. 
The logic of Judge Posner’s Crawford opinion, therefore, suggests 
that the Court’s longstanding treatment of voting as something akin to 
an individual “super right”—a treatment that has underscored nearly 
every judicial opinion in the area of voting rights from Reynolds 
through Bush v. Gore—is fundamentally in error.  While it is highly 
unlikely that affirmation would result in a sudden sea change in the 
Court’s jurisprudence, Crawford could be the thin edge of the wedge 
that calls for long-term adjustment in the Court’s voting jurispru-
dence.  Such an adjustment would place greater emphasis on the role 
of voting in creating good government, granting governments, in 
some ways for better and in others, potentially, for worse, more leeway 
in crafting redistricting and voting procedures. 
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I agree with Professor Smith that there is an air of unreality sur-
rounding the voter ID debate, suggesting that the issue may have 
more symbolic than practical importance.  But I also think that much 
of that unreality stems from debating voter ID in the abstract, as a 
monolithic proposition, with an underlying assumption that all voter 
ID laws are equivalently evil or equivalently virtuous.  In fact, voter ID 
regimes come in a wide variety of flavors—some mild, others pi-
cante—and one thing to look for in Crawford is whether the Justices 
have a sufficiently sensitive palate. 
Consider the law in Crawford itself.  It permits voters who lack the 
required ID to cast a provisional ballot that will count if they submit 
an affidavit that gives either of two acceptable reasons:  (1) they are 
indigent and unable to obtain an ID without paying a fee or (2) they 
have a religious objection to being photographed.  Would it be so 
problematic for the state to add a third acceptable ground for submit-
ting an affidavit in lieu of the ID:  unforeseeable delay in securing un-
derlying documents, like a birth certificate, that are a prerequisite for 
obtaining one of the restrictive pieces of voter ID that qualify under 
state law?  The state may be correct in claiming that extremely few in-
dividuals who wish to vote experience this kind of unexpected diffi-
culty.  But if that is true, then what is the harm to the state in giving 
these few individuals a method to validate their provisional ballots 
comparable to what the state already provides for indigents and reli-
gious objectors? 
The state’s interest in denying this third “hardship” ground for an 
affidavit alternative is even more dubious when one considers that the 
state could create, as part of the affidavit process, an additional obliga-
tion to provide some other form of corroborating evidence as to the 
voter’s identity (for example, a separate affidavit from a family mem-
ber or neighbor, to authenticate the voter’s identity and explanation 
for lacking the qualifying piece of ID).  With this corroboration pro-
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fraudulently attempting to impersonate a different registered voter—
which, after all, is the state’s professed concern.  Moreover, the fact 
that other states, like Michigan, extend the affidavit alternative to this 
additional hardship situation belies any claim on the part of Indiana 
that it would be infeasible to do so. 
There also is a common sense explanation why the plaintiffs in 
Crawford could not produce any individuals who fell into this third 
hardship category.  Who knows in advance that he or she will have un-
foreseeable difficulties in getting a birth certificate?  Thus, the fact 
that no one can predict which particular individual voters will need 
this third basis for invoking the affidavit alternative does not mean 
that the need will not exist.  Judge Posner’s contrary logic would limit 
health insurance for rare diseases to only those persons who know for 
certain in advance that they will contract the disease—a logic that ob-
viously defies the whole point of health insurance.  Provisional voting 
is a form of election insurance, yet Judge Posner would render it use-
less in the situation where it is most necessary:  the unpredictable ob-
stacle to completing the qualifying paperwork. 
Now I readily acknowledge that the idea that each individual voter 
ought to have insurance to protect against unforeseeable snafus in 
getting the necessary documentation is built on a premise that Profes-
sor Smith wishes to question:  the paramount importance of protect-
ing each citizen’s right to vote.  Voting is overvalued in constitutional 
law, Professor Smith suggests, especially in relation to other constitu-
tional rights (like property, free speech, or the right to bear arms).  At 
one level, I have no argument with this suggestion.  In any contest be-
tween democracy (process) and justice (substance), most people will 
choose justice hands down. 
At another level, however, just the opposite is true.  The problem 
is that reasonable people don’t always agree about what justice (sub-
stance) requires.  So they need democracy (process) to resolve their 
differences of opinion about justice (substance) in order to live to-
gether.  In the institutional arrangements that determine the rules by 
which people accept the authority of government over their lives—in 
other words, constitutional law—developing a fair set of democratic 
procedures necessarily must take precedence over insisting that one’s 
own substantive vision of justice must prevail over the competing sub-
stantive visions of justice advanced by one’s fellow citizens. 
Professor Smith is correct insofar as he suggests that a fair set of 
democratic procedures requires more than voting rights.  Some form 
of free speech is undoubtedly essential to a fair democratic process.  
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Some form of private property is also likely essential, although it is 
more controversial to contend that a fair democracy depends upon 
the right of individual citizens to bear arms (and, if so, what kinds).  
But whatever the full panoply of individual rights that is necessary for 
any democratic process to be fair, equal voting rights for all adult citi-
zens surely would be included.  Equal voting rights are a prerequisite 
to democratic fairness not only for their instrumental value, which is 
most readily apparent when likeminded citizens pool their equal vot-
ing rights to prevail under majority rule; but also, equal voting rights 
are an essential ingredient to democratic fairness for the additional 
symbolic—but no less important—reason that they signify the equality 
of citizenship upon which democratic fairness depends.  Thus, what-
ever adjustments and refinements we might wish to make to constitu-
tional law, we cannot negate the status of one-person-one-vote as a 
“superright,” to use Professor Smith’s term. 
I am also prepared to agree with Professor Smith that the set of 
rules for administering a fair democracy should include some form of 
a voter ID requirement.  I am not sure, however, that I would attribute 
this point to a “broken windows” theory of election law.  Instead, I 
would suggest that it inheres in the “superright” status of one-person-
one-vote and its symbolic importance as the legal manifestation of 
equal citizenship.  Precisely because the right to cast a ballot that 
counts equally as much as every other citizen’s ballot is so fundamen-
tal, each citizen needs to confirm that he or she is a proper possessor 
of this precious right—and is entitled to know that every other voter 
also can confirm this equal entitlement.  In this respect, both Profes-
sor Smith and I believe that it honors the importance (he would say 
“seriousness”) of voting rights to require each voter to demonstrate 
one’s authenticity as an eligible citizen (or, in Smith’s words, “[to] 
demonstrate that he is who he claims to be”). 
I stress again, however, that the particular methods of this authen-
tication make a difference.  I share the view that traditional methods 
of authentication, primarily reliance on poll workers to recognize 
their neighbors, are outdated.  As Professor Smith says, modernity and 
rationality require some form of documentation, which as we have 
seen may include an affidavit alternative for the few individuals who 
unexpectedly cannot obtain the primary method of documentation in 
time.  But a fair effort to introduce modernity and rationality to this 
authentication process would use a form of public-spirited (or civic-
minded) reasoning that attempted to consider the interests of all citi-
zens equally, rather than to select a more onerous than necessary 
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method of authentication because it would promote a partisan advan-
tage. 
The best way to illustrate the difference between public-spirited 
reasoning versus the effort to promote partisan advantage is to invoke 
the idea of a “veil of ignorance” made famous by the political philoso-
pher John Rawls.  Try to imagine as best as you can that you did not 
know whether you were a Republican or Democrat, rich or poor, lucky 
or unlucky, and so forth.  What form of voter identification proce-
dures—methods to authenticate each other’s equality of citizenship—
would you adopt?  In considering potential alternatives, you would in-
sist on one that was fair to everyone regardless of personal circum-
stances.  This “veil of ignorance” thought experiment might not be 
able to settle upon the single fairest voter identification system, but 
rather would point to a range of options all of which are appropriately 
fair and reasonable to choose among.  But this thought experiment 
undoubtedly would rule out some voter ID alternatives as unduly par-
tisan. 
I do not say that the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Four-
teenth Amendment, in Crawford or any other case, necessarily should 
embrace all details of John Rawls’s political philosophy.  But I do 
think, as a majority of the current Justices (including Justices Stevens 
and Kennedy) have articulated, that the Fourteenth Amendment em-
bodies a commitment to governmental impartiality toward all equal 
citizens, a commitment that requires public-spirit reasoning (rather 
than the promotion of partisan advantage) on matters as fundamental 
as the implementation of one-person-one-vote in the design of the 
democratic process.  Thus, I do think that the Supreme Court needs 
to rule out particular forms of voter ID requirements that are evi-
dently partisan, rather than within the range of reasonably fair alter-
natives. 
I recognize that some Justices, most notably Justices Scalia and 
Thomas, are suspicious of an approach to the Fourteenth Amendment 
that calls for judicial reliance on public-spirited reasoning, instead of 
judicial reliance on longstanding traditional practices.  But in this re-
gard there is perhaps a potential irony in the making.  A tradition-
based approach to the Fourteenth Amendment would be highly dubi-
ous about the constitutionality of any new law that required voters to 
document their identity, since these new laws form no part of the tra-
dition of democracy in America.  Instead, as Professor Smith says and I 
have concurred, they are an effort to bring modernity and rationality 
to our democratic process.  Thus, it will be interesting to see whether 
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Justices Scalia and Thomas employ their tradition-based approach in 
evaluating the constitutionality of the voter ID law in Crawford. 
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CLOSING STATEMENT 
Bradley A. Smith 
The Supreme Court cannot decide Crawford, or other current vot-
ing controversies, by a simplistic appeal to “fairness” or “equality” of 
process. 
Professor Foley argues that whatever other rights are necessary to 
a fair process, “fair, equal voting rights for all adult citizens surely 
would be included.”  Perhaps, but what is “fair” and “equal”?  As Pro-
fessor Foley notes elsewhere, “people don’t always agree about what 
justice . . . requires,” and they don’t all agree about what is a fair and 
equal process, either.  If “fair, equal voting rights” means, to give just 
one example, that convicted felons serving their sentences could vote 
equally with all others, I suspect that such a proposition would lose, 
even if put to an initial vote that included such felons among “all adult 
citizens.”  In fact, all democracies in history have placed restrictions on 
the power to vote.  In modern times, the United States and other de-
mocracies have gone much further than ever before, and almost en-
tirely for the good, in expanding the franchise.  But restrictions on 
voting remain.  Even the concept of “adult” is up for grabs—how old 
must one be?  Sixteen? Eighteen? Twenty-one?  And why only citizens, 
a somewhat arbitrary concept that can itself be influenced— and lim-
ited—by law? 
Professor Foley’s conclusion that, because “people don’t always 
agree about what justice . . . requires,” democracy is the only process 
that can “resolve their differences of opinion about justice . . . in order 
to live together,” does not follow.  Societies may, for example, rely on 
monarchy, dictatorship, the reign of judges, or some other form of so-
cial arrangement to assure social peace.  Democracy is not the only 
option.  We have adopted it because we have concluded in light of 
theory and experience, and rightly in my view, that it is the best op-
tion.  But if democracy is adopted because it is seen as the best way to 
sustain political peace and valued substantive rights, it does not follow 
that there can be no restriction on voting.  Indeed, there are many al-
ready.  Moreover, we are not writing on a blank slate.  Rather, the 
Court is being asked to interpret a written Constitution long in place. 
“Democracy” is a term often used loosely.  Who has not run across 
the crusty old conservative who insists, “We do not live in a democracy; 
we live in a republic”?  In the classical sense of the word, he is right.  
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We do not live in a pure democracy.  Just as we cannot all agree on 
what constitutes social justice, there is no reason to think there would 
be agreement that we must therefore submerge our concepts of sub-
stantive justice to a vote, or that we would agree on who is entitled to 
vote when voting is appropriate.  Nor does our Constitution require 
this.  Quite the opposite, I suggest—perhaps the closest we have ever 
come to a consensus in this country is that substantive justice is best 
achieved by assuring that most substantive decisions are not subject to 
democratic determination.  We certainly have chosen to remove 
much, if not most, of our lives from the maw of democracy, from the 
trivial and private (thank goodness we did not vote on what I ordered 
for dinner tonight), to the vital (our Constitution does not allow us to 
vote to lock up all lawyers, no matter how much public opinion de-
mands it) and public (we retain the right to speak and publish).  Even 
on issues of process, democracy is sporadic.  We don’t vote for every 
office, and we don’t vote every morning, every week, or every month, 
or even every year for who will exercise the power of elected office.  
Citizens of Ohio do not vote for the California congressional repre-
sentatives, though Democratic Leader (and California Congress-
woman) Nancy Pelosi’s efforts in the House certainly can affect us 
here in the heartland.  Still, few think this is not “fair” and “equal.” 
Our system is loaded with counter-majoritarian checks and bal-
ances, and devices intended to keep government—democracy—out of 
our lives.  Our government is structured around the recognition that 
democracy is a tool to assure that substantive values such as privacy 
and property are protected—and the further recognition that, when 
abused, it is also a tool for destroying those same substantive values.  
For those reasons, voting has long been regulated.  Our representa-
tional system of government was not adopted because we could not 
agree on substance.  Rather, it was adopted because there was broad 
agreement on a few substantive principles, and on limited democracy 
as the best way to preserve both that agreement and those principles. 
This brings us back to Crawford, and Judge Posner’s provocative 
opinion for the Seventh Circuit.  The issue in the case is not that indi-
viduals are being denied the right to vote; rather, their ability to vote is 
conditioned on the requirement that they produce photo IDs in ac-
cordance with the law.  This may keep a small number from voting, 
but it is not quite the same as denying them the vote.  Every restriction 
on voting will burden the franchise, and at each step some small 
number of voters may decide voting is not worth the effort.  As Judge 
Posner notes, in practice at least half the registered electorate already 
decides not to cast a ballot in any election, and this is due to a calcula-
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tion, at some level, that the costs of voting outweigh the benefits.  
Many others, of course, do not even register to vote.  No one, I think, 
believes that government must remove all costs to voting for all indi-
viduals, or even reduce them to an absolute minimum, to maintain a 
constitutional system. 
The number of people who cannot vote because of Indiana’s law 
must be quite small.  Professor Foley’s suggestion that the reason 
Crawford plaintiffs were unable to identify any individuals who actually 
wanted to vote, but were legally barred, was because individuals can-
not predict that they will have problems getting ID seems strained.  
And in any case, if there were really many such individuals they would 
presumably be easily identified after the election and would have 
standing to sue under the doctrine of capable of repetition but avoid-
ing review. 
Professor Foley suggests that it would be simple for the state to 
improve on the law by adding another exception to its photo ID rule.  
Perhaps.  But that merely puts back to the Court the question of how 
far it ought to go in protecting the right to cast a ballot at all costs.  Is 
the fact that the law might have been made marginally less burden-
some enough to strike it down?  Maybe, under a “least restrictive 
means” analysis, but that is not so easy to determine either.  For ex-
ample, decreasing by one the number of voting machines, or closing 
the polls at 7:00 p.m rather than 7:30 p.m., could lead to some eligible 
voter deciding the added burden made voting not worthwhile.  At this 
point, we should see that a decision that relies on sweeping platitudes 
about the “right to vote” being “preservative of all others” won’t neces-
sarily get us where we want to go. 
The point here is that the Court cannot seriously adopt a standard 
declaring that anything inhibiting any otherwise eligible person from 
voting is unconstitutional.  Such a holding would effectively annul all 
voter registration requirements and demand massive judicial supervi-
sion of the voting process, including polling hours and places, since 
those, too, can and will discourage some from voting.  So the Court 
will have to make a decision—what requirements can be placed on the 
right to vote?  At what point does a burden become too great? 
In considering this issue, conspicuously missing from the evidence 
presented to the Court are good numbers on either (a) the number of 
eligible voters who would like to vote, but cannot because of Indiana’s 
photo ID law, or (b) the number of ineligible voters who would be 
prevented from voting fraudulently by Indiana’s photo ID law.  This is 
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all the more reason for caution about basing the decision on broad 
declarations of principles. 
In this situation, if the Court substitutes vacuous statements about 
the precious nature of the right to vote for serious analysis of the pre-
cious nature of the right to vote, it will gain praise in editorial pages 
but do little to truly resolve the difficult issues at stake.  A sweeping 
opinion striking down the Indiana photo ID law will likely open the 
court to a raft of litigation challenging election procedures, many of 
which will be filed in the heat of election day, demanding that no bar-
rier stand between the would-be voter and the ballot box. 
How, then, to develop the “sensitive palate” that both Professor 
Foley and I would like to see? 
What Judge Posner grasps is that, given the extreme improbability 
that any one vote will decide an election, it is not particularly impor-
tant to any one individual to actually vote or have his ballot counted, 
so long as such exclusions are not the result of discrimination on in-
vidious grounds against groups or individuals.  In Crawford, the Sev-
enth Circuit did not see this type of invidious discrimination.  The 
Court accepted plaintiffs’ claim that the law will fall most heavily on 
lower-income voters, but poverty is not generally considered a “suspect 
class,” and almost any voter registration requirement, or even the re-
quirement to travel to specified polling locations, can be said to fall 
more heavily on the poor than on other income classes.  Perhaps the 
Supreme Court should consider this more seriously, but it will be 
charting new ground to do so.  The Court of Appeals also conceded 
that these low-income voters were more likely to be Democratic voters 
than Republican voters.  But the Supreme Court has also refused, with 
rare exception, to find invidious discrimination in election laws 
merely because they adversely impact particular political parties, espe-
cially major parties. 
Like the plaintiffs, Professor Foley suggests that the problem is 
that the Indiana voter ID law is unduly partisan in its effects.  Voters in 
a Rawlsian original position, he argues, would reject a scheme with 
partisan effects.  I think that is wrong. 
Leaving aside that there is little evidence of any major partisan ef-
fect (precisely because there is little evidence that large numbers of 
people will be prevented from voting, properly or fraudulently), we 
might consider that under a true “veil of ignorance,” voters would not 
know who benefits from a law.  Professor Foley suggests that the “veil 
of ignorance” cuts against the Indiana law, but gets there only by, in 
fact, removing the veil to look at the partisan effects.  Absent such 
knowledge, why would voters in a Rawlsian “original position” insist on 
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a law making it marginally easier for a very small percentage of the 
population to vote, knowing that the odds were about 99:1 that they 
would not be in that position, and knowing that, by perhaps prevent-
ing some small amount of fraud, a photo ID requirement would help 
guarantee in some small way such value as their own votes might have?  
And in fact, as I noted in my Opening Statement, most voters see 
photo ID laws as “common sense,” with substantial support across 
party lines.  Whether or not they directly prohibit much fraud may be 
beside the point—implicitly adopting the “broken windows” theory of 
election law, voters perceive that fixing the small problems and tidying 
up the neighborhood can prevent larger problems from developing. 
In this context, is it unduly partisan if Republicans support a 
common sense law that has adverse impact on Democrats, or does the 
undue partisanship occur when Democrats oppose a common sense 
law merely because it has a marginally positive impact for Republi-
cans?  Or, in the context of another current controversy, there may be 
constitutional arguments for granting felons the power to vote, but 
simply because granting the vote to convicted felons might benefit 
Democrats vis à vis Republicans is probably not one of them. 
The Supreme Court has struck down literacy tests and poll taxes as 
a requirement for voting, but those decisions came in light of substan-
tial evidence that the tests were being applied in a racially discrimina-
tory fashion and for racially discriminatory purposes.  Plaintiffs in 
Crawford make different claims—that the requirement of ID is itself 
discriminatory, regardless of how it is administered, and that it was 
enacted for partisan rather than racial purposes.  This is a difficult 
road to travel, in that the burden on individual voters seems small, 
even if the benefits seem tenuous as well.  It is tempting, in such a 
case, to err on the side of protecting the power to vote.  But erring on 
the side of protecting the power to vote is to ipso facto err on the side 
of diluting the votes of legitimate voters with those of fraudulent vot-
ers.  Put that way—that we should err on the side of vote dilution—the 
argument doesn’t seem so compelling, at least not in the absence of 
good evidence about the extent of either voting fraud or the true bur-
den on voters. 
As I noted in my Opening, I strongly suspect that the immediate 
stakes in Crawford are much lower than the parties to the case seem to 
believe.  How the Court reasons may therefore be far more important, 
over time, than how it rules.  Hopefully, the Court will make a serious 
effort to come to grips with the Posner challenge, and craft an opin-
ion that gives the power to vote the serious analysis that a precious 
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right deserves, rather than relying on vague platitudes about “preserv-
ing all other rights.” 
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CLOSING STATEMENT 
Edward B. Foley 
Professor Smith and I started our discussion with a specific Su-
preme Court case, Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, which con-
cerns the constitutionality of Indiana’s particular version of a voter ID 
law.  We very quickly moved to deep and difficult questions of political 
philosophy concerning the nature of democracy and its relationship 
to individual rights.  We then came back to the details of Crawford. 
Ronald Dworkin would be pleased with this traversal.  After all, he 
is the one who insists that important cases of constitutional law—like 
Crawford—cannot be thought through on their merits without delving 
into those deep philosophical questions.  One need not subscribe to 
Dworkin’s answers to those philosophical questions, or indeed to his 
views on particular constitutional cases, to think that perhaps he has a 
point on this jurisprudential connection between specific facts and 
general theory in the adjudication of cases. 
In any event, precisely because questions of political philosophy 
are so difficult, it is impossible to do them justice (pun intended) in 
the space we have for this discussion.  Professor Smith is correct that 
we could have a Hobbesian social contract merely to keep the peace, 
but that would not be a fair social contract, or so most people would 
agree.  Professor Smith is also right that most people believe that a fair 
social contract must protect certain substantive rights from abridge-
ment by the government, no matter how democratic that government 
may be.  The social contract tradition from Locke through Rawls, in-
cluding of course our own constitutional Bill of Rights, subscribes to 
that view. 
But as Rawls himself recognized, while his own Theory of Justice was 
put through the philosophical wringer, it is not so easy to get agree-
ment on the substantive rights that the social contract should pro-
tect—except perhaps at a level of abstraction (“life, liberty, and the 
pursuit of happiness,” or is it “of property”?) that, as Professor Smith 
acknowledges, is but platitudinous.  Our own constitutional history 
bears this out.  Rights deemed obviously part of a fair social contract 
in the Lochner era were repudiated after the New Deal.  Roe v. Wade, 
which seemed relatively straightforward in 1973, was anything but a 
decade later.  As for the suggestion that our own Constitution is robus-
tly counter-majoritarian, the recent confirmation battles over Supreme 
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Court nominees—which is our nation’s new method of amending the 
Constitution, since Article V is too difficult—demonstrate that the ju-
dicial interpretation of the social contract over time will be decidedly 
majoritarian in character. 
All of this is not to say that we shouldn’t wrestle with issues of con-
stitutional architecture, including how best to keep important liberties 
relatively immune from populist impulses.  But it won’t be easy.  And 
when I assert that we need a fair process for debating the issues on 
which we disagree, Professor Smith—like philosopher Jeremy Wal-
dron—argues that we won’t be able to agree on what process to use.  
Maybe, but we have to start somewhere.  Otherwise, the game is over 
before we even begin.  If we want a fair social contract, as both Profes-
sor Smith and I do, then we need to go back and try to develop as best 
we can a fair, mutually agreeable method for identifying the terms of 
this contract. 
But how does all this philosophy relate to the actual practice of 
constitutional interpretation by the Supreme Court, either in general 
or in Crawford specifically?  As a nation, we are at a difficult stage of 
our constitutional development.  We have become unmoored from 
originalism, and we can’t get back (notwithstanding Justice Thomas’s 
desire to do so—not even Justice Scalia is willing to roll the clock all 
the way back).  The Court, regrettably, has also become untethered 
from stare decisis.  All the Justices feel free to overrule whatever prece-
dents they find objectionable.  They just differ on which ones they ob-
ject to.  But for this reason, an appeal to “fundamental principles of 
constitutional interpretation” is no basis for a shared understanding of 
how to decide cases:  the Justices differ on those fundamental princi-
ples (i.e., beliefs of political philosophy), which is why they disagree so 
vehemently about which cases to overrule.  The amendment process is 
no practical means for keeping errant Justices in check—which, again, 
is why it all comes down to who sits on the Court at any moment in 
time.  And with a nine-member body that has one individual who is in 
the middle, what that means is control by a single philosopher-king.  
Constitutional interpretation as intellectual autobiography:  maybe it 
really is a Hobbesian social contract, after all. 
Given this state of affairs, I cannot—and do not—profess to have 
an answer to Crawford that everyone else must accept as objectively 
correct.  Instead, as I will argue at length in a preview essay on Craw-
ford to be published in the Election Law Journal, the goal for the Court 
in the case should be to avoid another 5-4 decision, so constitutional 
law does not continue to be a dictate of Justice Kennedy’s personal be-
liefs.  A unanimous decision from the Court in Crawford would be most 
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salutary—whether upholding or invalidating the statute, and there are 
plausible grounds for either result—but a 7-2 result would do. 
To achieve that kind of consensus, however, would require nar-
rowing the ground for the decision.  Justices Souter and Alito are not 
likely to agree to any big statements about equal protection, levels of 
scrutiny, or voting rights—much less Justices Ginsburg and Thomas.  
In searching for a possible ground on which seven if not nine Justices 
could agree, it seems most promising to focus on the “tailoring” prong 
of Fourteenth Amendment analysis:  whether the law is perhaps exces-
sively rigid even in relationship to its admittedly valid goals.  There 
presumably needs to be some tailoring inquiry, whatever doctrinal 
“level of scrutiny” applies, and maybe the Justices can agree on 
whether the law passes or flunks this tailoring inquiry without settling 
on exactly what level of scrutiny they are applying or what theory of 
voting rights leads them to that level. 
As I suggest in the much longer Election Law Journal essay, perhaps 
there is a way for seven or nine Justices to agree that Indiana’s law is 
adequately tailored.  But that result seems possible only if the limited 
range of permissible IDs under Indiana’s law actually serves the inter-
ests of voting rights, either because it shortens the time in line at poll-
ing places or reduces the number of mistakes that poll workers make.  
(Otherwise, I see even the moderately liberal Justices, Breyer and 
Souter, balking at this compromise.)  But even then, the search for 
common ground seems a long shot, unless it is really too much to ask 
Indiana to add the additional hardship exemption I described in my 
opening contribution to this dialogue. (“Okay,” I can hear these two 
Justices saying to themselves, “you can have your narrow list, but you 
still need an escape hatch for those who unexpectedly can’t get the 
right kind of document.”) 
Professor Smith is right that voting regulations often might be a 
little more voter-friendly (polls staying open an extra half-hour, to use 
his example).  But the tailoring prong generally requires sensitive 
judgments about matters of degree—what’s reasonable or unreason-
able in particular factual circumstances.  One could imagine the Jus-
tices thinking, “States can choose between twelve and fourteen hours 
of voting, but a state that adopts the most limited list of permissible 
forms of identification needs to offer a wider safety valve for those 
lacking these particular forms than just the destitute or the religious 
objector.”  Can we imagine even the two newest Justices, Roberts and 
Alito, embracing this thought?  There is not enough of a track record 
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with these two yet, but since I’m wishing for at least a 7-2 decision, I’m 
letting a lack of information be a basis for hope. 
Perhaps more realistic, however, is a remand for further explora-
tion of the factual issues relevant to the tailoring prong.  Justice Souter 
might not be willing to embrace the idea that Indiana’s law is an ap-
propriate method for verifying identification, and Justice Alito might 
be reluctant to say that the law is an impermissible method without an 
extra hardship exemption.  But maybe they would be willing to agree 
that the lower courts in Crawford didn’t really consider the tailoring 
issue at all and should do so. 
To be sure, a narrow remand of that kind wouldn’t be a momen-
tous decision—except that any decision avoiding a 5-4 split in Crawford 
would be remarkable for that reason alone.  If Crawford lacks practical 
significance, then an unmomentous remand is precisely what the case 
deserves.  It certainly is an ideologically charged case, as Professor 
Smith observes right at the outset.  A 7-2, or 9-0, remand would diffuse 
this ideological charge.  Surely, eliminating ideological controversy, 
especially when it is unnecessary, is a worthwhile goal of Supreme 
Court decisions. 
In the end, maybe Cass Sunstein’s call for minimalism is the best 
we can hope for.  Ronald Dworkin surely would not agree with that.  
But maybe Dworkin would take some comfort in knowing that it was 
our exploration into the depths of philosophy, and discovering all the 
quagmires of fundamental disagreement, that led us back to the quest 
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